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Abstract 
Both behavioral economics and computational intelligence (machine learning) rely on 
the extensive use of heuristics to address decision-making problems in an ill-defined 
and ill-structured environment. While the former has a focus on behaviors, and the 
other has a focus on the algorithms, this distinction is merely superficial.  The real 
connection between the two is that through algorithmic procedure the latter provides 
the former with the computational underpinnings of the decision-making processes. In 
this chapter, we review this connection, dubbed computational behavioral economics. 
To do so, we review a number of frequently-used computational intelligence tools in 
the realm of computational economics, including K nearest neighbors, K means, self-
organizing maps, reinforcement learning, decision trees, evolutionary computation, 
swarm intelligence, and “random” behavior. This review enables us to see how the 
heuristics employed in the latter, such as closeness, similarity, smoothness, default, 
automation, hierarchy, and modularity can lay a computational foundation of the 
heuristics studied by the former.  	
 
Keywords: Computational Intelligence, Instance-based Decision, Reinforcement 
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1 Introduction   
 
Computational intelligence has been frequently applied to modeling artificial agents 
in agent-based computational economics. Commonly used applications include 
reinforcement learning (Chen, 2013), classifier systems (Vriend, 2002), genetic 
algorithms, genetic programming (Chen, 2002a,b), swarm intelligence (Boyer, 
Brorsen and Zhang, 2014), and  instance-based learning (Pape and Kurtz, 2013). They 
are considered as alternative toolkits for the classical or Bayesian statistical models in 
modeling bounded-rationality and adaptive behavior (Sargent, 1993). However, these 
toolkits, except for reinforcement learning, are not explicitly grounded in psychology. 
It, therefore, remains to be seen whether these “machines” (artificial agents) are 
related to the bounded-rational agents as conceived by behavioral economists. Or, 
alternatively, to what extent can we relate the general principles or practices that are 
frequently applied in behavioral economics to the designs of these machines?   
 
This issue has generally been ignored in the literature on behavioral economics, since 
machine learning and artificial intelligence remain a focus only for few branches of 
behavioral economics, specifically those following the legacy of Herbert Simon. On 
the other hand, this issue has not been well noticed in the literature on the machine 
learning community either. Although the machine learning community is well aware 
of the prevalence of ill-defined or poorly-structured problems, this understanding is 
rarely extended to the context of economic decision making; specifically, these two 
communities do not systematically share a background of the methodological 
controversy related to the divide between Homo Economicus and Homo Sapiens 
(Thaler, 2000). Therefore, with the dual ignorance, the fundamental connection 
between computational intelligence and behavioral economics is either missing or it 
only exists in an implicit manner.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to uncover this fundamental connection and to give it a 
systematic treatment. We attempt to do so by reviewing the behavioral economic 
principles behind computational intelligence tools. On the basis of this fundamental 
connection that we establish, we can see how agents, equipped with some 
“intelligence designs”, substantiate the behavioral constraints and heuristics through 
implementable (computational) procedures. We refer to this as substantiation or 
implementation and to the general approach as computational behavioral economics.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some general 
features of decision making. This review motivates the framework used in this 
chapter. The framework begins with routines, defaults or automated decisions. 
Section 3 addresses the role of computational intelligence in shaping this kind of 
decision process. This connection between computational intelligence and behavioral 
economics is illustrated by the instance-based decisions, such as K nearest neighbors, 
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and other related algorithms, such as K means, self-organizing maps and 
reinforcement learning. To cope with information or choice overload, heuristics based 
on instances need to be structured in a hierarchical form. Section 4 addresses how 
computational intelligence can be applied to examine this more advanced decision 
making behavior. Section 5 discusses the formation of novel heuristics, including the 
discovery of new attributes, new instances, and new hierarchies. The formation 
processes involve the idea of autonomous agents, whose behaviors are driven by the 
modularity heuristic. Computational modeling of these behaviors can be assisted by 
evolutionary computation, which provides an effective representation of behavioral 
heterogeneities among decision makers. Decision making can be affected by peers, 
colleagues, neighbors, and social norms. These behaviors have also been found in 
entomological experiments and some of them have been well formulated in 
computational intelligence. Section 6 provides a brief account of this development. 
Section 7 discusses some problems of treating randomization as a heuristic in decision 
making. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.  
 
2 Decision Making and Choices   
 
Before we proceed, it may be useful to notice a common feature shared by both 
behavioral economists and machine learning scholars. For both of them, the “real 
world” is a world filled with ill-structured and vaguely-defined problems. Many 
intelligent toolkits were proposed mainly to deal with these challenges. These 
challenges involve a kind of uncertainty, ambiguity or vagueness, which cannot be 
well formulated in a probabilistic environment and hence cannot be solved using 
standard rational (optimization) procedures that are built upon statistical decision 
theory or the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximization paradigm 
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). One of the most telling examples was given 
by Gerd Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer, 2007).   
A professor from Columbia University was struggling over whether 
to accept an offer from a rival university or to stay. His colleague 
took him aside and said, “Just maximize your expected utility–you 
always write about doing this.” Exasperated, the professor 
responded, “Come on, this is serious.” (Ibid, p.3)   
A little reflection on this somewhat embarrassing situation highlights some important 
facets of decision making. First, many decisions are inconsequential, but some are 
not. Second, some choice or decision problems are encountered frequently; some less 
often. Accepting a new job offer or keeping the current job is not an inconsequential 
decision and is not the kind of decision which we make frequently; nevertheless, this 
kind of decision problem is prevalent in a normal economic life. Third, while it may 
be difficult to figure out the exact number of decisions that we make in a typical day, 
this number can be large and definitely larger than we might think (Wansink and 
Sobal, 2007). Fourth, we spend very little time making many choices or decisions and 
due to time constraints, many of us do not allow ourselves to spend too much time 
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making those decisions (Mormann, Koch and Rangel, 2011). Fifth, many decisions 
are often made by processes that may be unclear for us, say, by emotion or gut 
feeling, or even automated (Damasio, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Newell and Shanks, 
2014). It is fortunate that many decisions do not take up much of our time and even 
need our conscious effort; therefore, we are still able to handle a sizeable number of 
decisions in a typical day, including those with sizable consequences and for which 
we have very little past experience.   
 
These above facets of decision-making problems suggest that there are two types of 
decision modes. First, these are the automated decision modes that can handle 
frequently encountered decisions, specifically, those inconsequential ones. Second, 
these are the decision modes that can address less frequent, less experienced, but 
consequential decisions. The first type of decision mode typically refers to those 
defaults and routines, whereas the second type of decision mode is a meta-level 
decision model, which can identify novel elements, and constantly review and revise 
all routines and defaults, thereby facilitating the discovery of new routines or defaults.   
 
Routine decision mode can be viewed as being organized in a hierarchical form as 
shown in Figure 1. This hierarchy has often been mentioned in behavioral economics, 
but probably the most prominent quotation is the following one from Friedrich Hayek 
(Hayek, 1945)1. 
   
We make constant use of formulas, symbols and rules whose meaning we 
do not understand and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the 
assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We have 
developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and 
institutions which have proved successful in their own sphere and which 
have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have built up. 
(Ibid, p. 528)   
 
In the following sections, we elaborate more on this notion of hierarchical 
decision making processes, involving routines or rules, that are based on the 
experiences of the agents.   
 
<<Insert Figure 1 here: [Figure 1: Routine Formulation]>> 
 
3 Routines and Instance-Based Decisions   
 
The two-level hierarchical decision framework begins with the idea of defaults or 
routines, a subject well studied in behavioral economics (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; 
Betsch and Haberstroh, 2014; Madrian, 2014). Routines help specify the rules 
																																																						
1 For a comprehensive treatment of Hayek’s contribution to behavioral economics, the 
interested reader is referred to Frantz and Lesson (2013). 
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concerning the default behavior for various problem instances. They allow us to 
economize on the time required for decision making and enhance the automated 
procedures for decision making. In this section, we shall address the behavioral 
features of using routines, and hence defaults, from the perspective of computational 
intelligence.   
 
Routine formulation plays an important role in computational intelligence. The 
essence of the idea is that, until otherwise stated, similar simulations tend to evoke 
similar responses (decisions, actions, and choices). The key then is to consider an 
appropriate notion of similarity. David Hume, in his book An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, has the following remark on experience and similarity.   
 
In reality all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we 
discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects 
similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects....  From 
causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our 
experimental conclusions. (Ibid, Section IV; Italics added)  
 
Among many computational intelligence toolkits, one illustration concerning the first 
of the two modes (i.e., default or routine mode) that is most familiar to economists is 
the case-based decision (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995, 2001). In computational 
intelligence, the case-based decision is also familiarly known as instance- based 
learning (Aha, Kibler, and Marc, 1991) or lazy learning (Aha, 1997)2.  
  
In instance-based decisions, the decision environment (instance) is characterized by 
its related features (attributes), for example, a vector a in an M-dimensional Euclidean 
space  𝑹", 𝐚	 ∈ 	𝑹". When the decision maker at time t faces a situation (instance) 
characterized by 𝐚(, we assume that she will recall her actions from her experience in 
similar situations in the past. Let 𝑨( be the memory space of the past instances,   
 𝐴( = 𝑎-	: 𝑠 < 𝑡 , (1) 
and 𝑹( be the subset of similar instances, i.e., 
 𝑹( = {𝐚3: 𝑘 < 𝑡, 𝐚3, 𝐚( = 𝜖3,( < 𝜖}, (2) 
                              
where ∙  is a metric which may be subjectively determined by the decision maker,  
and the distance 𝜖, also subjectively determined, dictates what are perceived as similar  
instances by the decision maker. Furthermore, let 𝑑( be the decision corresponding to 
an instance 𝐚(. The instance-based decision rule d((𝐚() is then the function  
 𝑑( = 𝑓(𝑫(), (3) 
where the set 𝑫( = {𝑑3: 𝑎3 ∈ 𝑹(}. 
																																																						
2 In the literature, it is also known as the instance-based decision or instance-based 
reasoning; in this chapter, we shall use these terms interchangeably. 
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Depending on the application domain, there are a number of possible functional forms 
that have been suggested in the literature. For example, if 𝑑( is a numerical decision, 
i.e., just a number, then a simple average of the past decisions under similar instances 
can form a new decision.  
 𝑑( = 𝑑3	>?∈𝑫@𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑫(), (4) 
 
where Card indicates cardinality. In addition to the simple average, weights or 
weighting functions can be further used to differentiate the similarity among different 𝐚3	to 𝐚(.   
 𝑑( = 𝑤3𝑑3,	>?∈𝑫@  (5) 
 
where   
 𝑤3 = 𝑔(𝜖3,()𝑔(𝜖-,(){-:𝐚E∈𝑹@} . (6) 
 
The function g is a transformation of the similarity index 𝜖-,(. If we let	𝜋3(𝑡) be the 
most updated strength of the rule 𝑑3 , i.e., the past experience (evaluation) of the 
performance of the rule 𝑑3, then in addition to similarity 𝜖3,(, the weight can also be 
adjusted based on 𝜋3(𝑡).  Hence,   
 𝑤3 = 𝑔(𝜖3,(, 𝜋3(𝑡))𝑔(𝜖-,(, 𝜋3(𝑡)){-:𝐚E∈𝑹@} . (7) 
 
If the decision is in the form of discrete choices, then the function can be given with a 
stochastic choice formulation.   
 Prob 𝑑( = 𝑑3 = 𝑔(𝜖3,(, 𝜋3(𝑡))𝑔(𝜖-,(, 𝜋3(𝑡)){-:𝐚E∈𝑹@} . (8) 
 
The above general discussion of the instance-based decision, with slight 
modifications, applies to a number of computational intelligence algorithms. 
Equations (4) to (6) constitute the basic form of K nearest neighbors (Chan et al., 
1999). Equation (8) is a more general version of reinforcement learning.   
 
3.1 K Nearest Neighbors   
 
The method of K-nearest neighbors (KNNs) is a typical experience-based 
computational behavioral model. In KNNs the idea of neighborhood, i.e., Equation 
(2), is altered and instead of imposing an upper limit 𝜖 to define the set 𝑹(, KNNs 
select the K most similar instances or the K most nearest neighbors. We can rank 𝜖-,( 
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in an ascending order and let the rank of 𝜖-,( be denoted as	R(𝜖-,(). Then the set of 
similar instances, Equation (2), is modified as follows.   
 
 𝑹( = 𝐚3: 𝑘 < 𝑡, R 𝜖3,( ≤ K . (9) 
 
KNNs has been initiated thrice by different academic communities, first, by engineers 
(Cover and Hart, 1967), then by statisticians (Stone, 1977; Cleveland, 1979), and 
finally by physicists (Farmer and Sidorowich, 1987). From these three origins, we can 
see how the similarity heuristic is introduced as a heuristic in information processing 
and statistics, and then later on to serve a computational model of behavioral 
economics (Chan et al., 1999).   
 
When our knowledge of the environment is incomplete or vague, our decisions 
naturally rely on or are biased towards familiar or similar experiences. The nearest 
neighbor was first used by Cover and Hart (1967) to give a notion of similarity. “In 
the classification problem there are two extremes of knowledge which the statistician 
may possess.  Either he may have complete statistical knowledge of the underlying 
joint distribution of the observation x and the true category	θ, or he may have no 
knowledge of the underlying distribution except that which can be inferred from 
sample....(Ibid, p.21).” In the second extreme case, “a decision to classify x  into 
category	θ	is allowed to depend only on a collection of n correctly classified samples 𝑥Q, 𝜃Q, , 𝑥S, 𝜃S, , … , 𝑥U, 𝜃U, , and the decision procedure is by no means clear. 
(Ibid, p. 21; Italics added)” With the absence of a clear decision procedure, Cover and 
Hart (1967) proposed the following heuristic. “Thus to classify the unknown sample x 
we may wish to weight the evidence of the nearby xV’s most heavily. Perhaps the 
simplest nonparametric decision of this form is the nearest neighbor (NN) rule, which 
classifies x  in the category of its nearest neighbor. (Ibid, p.21; bold and italics 
original)”   
 
KNNs was later introduced in the literature on robust local regression by Cleveland 
(1979). However, instead of having closeness or similarity as the main pursuit, the 
key focus here is on smoothness, specifically, the smoothness of the conditional 
density function. As commonly seen in functional approximation; its main goal is to 
regulate the polynomial degree of curve fitting. However, in addition to functional 
approximation, it is also fundamentally connected to the pursuit of simplicity in the 
science of discovery (Li and Vitanyi, 2008).  
 
The smoothness heuristic is related to the closeness heuristic under the instance-based 
reasoning principle, where similar inputs are expected to have similar outputs. This 
principle implies a response surface which is simple in terms of its descriptive 
complexity or algorithmic complexity (Li and Vitanyi, 2008); in other words, the 
instance-based decision model helps the decision maker to give a more concise 
description of her decision making process, specifically explaining why such a 
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decision is made. Without the closeness and smoothness constraints, the simplicity of 
the decision-response surface may be lost, and, given the increased complexity, an 
automated decision becomes hardly available, and the decision will have to be left to    
“the man on the spot” (Hayek, 1945, pp. 524-525). Such kinds of non-smooth 
decisions may be time-consuming, but their frequency must be limited, given the time 
constraint to which each decision maker is subjected.   
 
In agent-based computational economics, nearest-neighbor agents were first used in 
an agent-based artificial stock market (Chan et al., 1999). The nearest-neighbor agent 
forecasts the price based on a moving window with a length l, which is also known as 
the embedding dimension. Let 𝑝( = 𝑙𝑛Z@/Z@\] and  
 
 𝒑(_ = (𝑝(, 𝑝(`Q, … , 𝑝(`(_`Q)). (10) 
 
To forecast 𝑝(aQ, the nearest-neighbor agent will find the past K historical windows 
(instances)  which are most similar to 𝒑(_ , i.e.,   
 
 𝑹( = 𝒑3_ : 𝑅 𝜖3,( ≤ 𝐾 , (11) 
 
where 𝜖3,( = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝒑3_ , 𝒑(_ ). Then an average of the price 𝑝3aQwill be used as the 
forecast of 𝑝(aQ.   
 𝑝(aQf = 𝑝3aQ3:𝒑?g ∈h@𝐾  (12) 
 
A difficult part of the instance-based decision is to address how instances are formed 
in the first place. In many real-life situations, whether two instances are closely 
related or similar can be hard to tell. A proposed distance or similarity measure can be 
sensitive to different attribute spaces. Some critical but hidden attributes could be 
ignored and may never be found. Nevertheless, what matters is not whether the 
decision maker has built her decision upon the “true” attribute space, but instead 
whether they actually follow instance-based reasoning to streamline their decisions. It 
can be argued that without such a framework, the decisions can be harder and may be 
less satisfactory. Accordingly Figure 1, the instance-based decision making addresses 
the needs of a less loaded decision-making process. Amartya Sen termed the situation 
decisional inescapability, in that a decision or a choice has to be made even before the 
completion of a judgmental process (Sen, 1997). To cope in this instance, decision 
makers may have to learn and evolve to develop various heuristics, such as the 
instance-based decisions, to handle these otherwise inescapable situations.  The often 
observed decision making based on stereotypes can be interpreted as an instance-
based decision (Bodenhausen, 1990; Chaxel, 2015; Fabre et al., 2015). Again, here, 
the stereotype attached to a specific instance, say, a person, a city, a country, a gender, 
a culture, or a brand, etc., can be imprecise, but what matters is that this frame 
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facilitates decision making, particularly when a reason is needed or when the time 
available for making the decision is severely limited. In fact, as we shall see below 
(Section 5), evolutionary computation can allow agents to discover useful instances, 
which constitutes a part of the learning for agents (Figure 1).  
 
3.2 K-Means and Self-Organizing Maps   
The number of nearest neighbors, i.e., K, obviously, is a key parameter in the KNN 
algorithm. The question of the optimum number of K has been addressed in the third 
of the above-mentioned intellectual origins of K nearest neighbors, i.e., the chaotic-
dynamics origin (physicist approach). In this stream of the literature, it has been 
shown that, based on the Takens’ theorem (Takens, 1981), K nearest neighbors can 
help forecast the chaotic time series, specifically, the deterministic chaotic time series. 
To do so, the parameter K is determined by the embedding dimension l (Equation 10). 
It has been suggested that k = 2(l + 1) (Casdagli, 1991), but, under the case of 
stochastic non-linear systems, it also depends on the noise level: the higher the added 
noise level, the higher the K. Nonetheless, the above analysis is entirely from a 
mathematical viewpoint. From a cognitive viewpoint, a number of other 
considerations need to be incorporated.   
 
First of all, how can humans actually retrieve similar instances from their memory, 
and how many such instances can be retrieved? Considering the brain with its limited  
capacity for memory, a pertinent question concerns how the brain deals with 
increasing  information by not memorizing all of it or by forgetting some of it. How 
does it do the much necessary pruning? This is still a non-trivial issue pursued by 
neuroscientists today3. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume the existence of some 
kind of redundancy reduction behavior. Hence, similar instances, due to a tolerance 
level for noises, may be combined into one instance; this way, each instance will not 
be uniquely stored, but only the reconstructed representative instances will be stored. 
A large number of instances are then substantially reduced to a few representative 
instances. Hence, when making a new decision, the number of referred neighbors may 
be very low, say, close to those magic numbers which psychologists normally refer to 
(Miller, 1956; Mathy and Feldman, 2012).  The computational model of the 
aforementioned compression behavior is known as a clustering algorithm in 
computational intelligence, and the two popularly used clustering algorithms are K-
means and Kohonen’s self-organizing maps (Kohonen, 1995). K-Means clustering, 
developed by MacQueen (1967), is one of the widely used clustering algorithms that 
																																																						
3 The same issue can interest economists as well, because it concerns the efficient use 
of limited space. A recent study on reward-motivated memory formation by neural 
scientists may provide an economic foundation for the memory formation (Adcock, 
2006). Adcock (2006) reports brain-scanning studies in humans that reveal how 
specific reward-related brain regions trigger the brain’s learning and memory regions 
to promote memory formation. 
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groups data with similar characteristics or features together. SOMs resemble K-
means. They both involve minimizing some measure of dissimilarity, called the cost 
functions, in the instances within each cluster. The difference between the K-means 
and the SOM lies in their associated cost functions. Consider a series of n instances, 
each of which has M numeric attributes:  
 
 𝐚Q", 𝐚S",… , 𝐚U", 𝐚V" ∈ 𝑹", ∀	𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 (13) 
 
where   
 𝐚V" ≡ 𝑎V,Q, 𝑎V,S, … , 𝑎V,n, . 𝑎V,o ∈ 𝑹, ∀	𝑙 = 1,2, … ,𝑀 (14) 
 
  The K-means clustering is to find a series of k clusters, the centroids of which are 
denoted, respectively, by   
 𝐶Q, 𝐶S, … , 𝐶3, 𝐶o ∈ 𝑹", ∀	𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑘 (15) 
such that each of the observations is assigned to one and only one of the clusters with 
a  minimal cost, and the cost function is defined as follows:  
 𝐶r`nfsU- = 	 𝐚V", 𝐶o3otQUVtQ ∙ 𝛿V,o, (16) 
 
where 𝐚V", 𝐶o  is the standard Euclidean distance between 𝐚V"  and	𝑪o4  , and 𝛿V,o  is 
the  delta function:  
 𝛿V,o = 1, 𝑖𝑓		𝐚V" ∈ 𝐶o0, 𝑖𝑓		𝐚V"¬∈ 𝐶o 
 
(17) 
  
To minimize the cost function (16), one can begin by initializing a set of k cluster 
centroids.  The positions of these centroids are then adjusted iteratively by first 
assigning the data samples to the nearest clusters and then recomputing the centroids.  
Corresponding to (16), the cost function associated with SOM can be roughly treated 
as follows:   
 𝐶z{" = 	 𝐚V", 𝐶o3otQUVtQ ∙ ℎ} 𝐚~ ,o	 , (18) 
 
where ℎ} 𝐚~ ,o	 is the neighborhood function or the neighborhood kernel, and 𝜔 𝐚V"  , 
the winner function, outputs the cluster whose centroid is nearest to the input 𝐚V" . In 
																																																						
4 Standard Euclidean distance assumes that the attributes are normalized and are of 
equal importance. However, this assumption may not hold in many application 
domains. In fact, one of the main problems in learning is to determine which are the 
important features. 
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practice, the neighborhood kernel is chosen to be wide at the beginning of the learning 
process to guarantee the global ordering of the map, and both its width and height 
decrease slowly during learning. For example, the Gaussian kernel whose variance 
monotonically decreases with iteration times is frequently used. By comparing 
Equation (16) with (18), one can see that in SOM the distance of each input from all 
of the centroids is weighted by the neighborhood kernel h, instead of just the closest 
one being taken into account.  Through either KNNs or SOM, our experiences of the 
past can then be constantly processed by clustering, which provides us with points of 
reference or anchors upon which the subsequent decisions can be based and 
facilitated.   
 
3.3 Reinforcement Learning   
In the context of discrete choice, Equation (8) is a more general version of 
reinforcement learning. To see this, simply impose the requirement that  ε to zero, i.e., 
only consider those perfectly identical instances, and require g to be a Gibbs-
Boltzmann distribution with the temperature parameter λ,  
 Prob 𝑑( = 𝑑( = 𝑒𝑥𝑝?(()𝑒𝑥𝑝E((){-:𝐚E∈h@} , (19) 
 
in which case we have a Roth-Erev version of reinforcement learning (Roth and Erev, 
1995).   
 
Reinforcement learning has already been applied to explain or predict human 
behavior in the context of game experiments. It is considered to be consistent with the 
robust properties of learning observed in the large experimental psychology literature 
on both human and animal learning, specifically, the Law of Effect (Roth and Erev, 
1995) 5 . The recent progress in neuroscience indicates that humans, and more 
generally, mammals are naturally endowed with a reinforcement learning mechanism 
in their brains. In fact, one of the most impressive recent results in neuroscience is the 
discovery of the relationship between the dopamine neural system and reinforcement 
learning6. Technically, reinforcement learning has been extended to take into account 
a number of psychological factors in learning, such as memory (Roth and Erev, 1995), 
counterfactual thinking (Camerer and Ho, 1999), aspiration (Erev and Roth, 1998) 
and attention (Chen and Hsieh, 2011).  
 
The standard version of reinforcement learning only considers a fixed and finite set of 
alternatives, since the decision environment is homogeneous. The typical example 
																																																						
5 Reinforcement learning has also been used to explain institutional change, more 
precisely, the interdependence between economic behavior of agents and institutional 
change. See Heinrich and Schwardt (2013). 
6 See Montague (2006), Chapter 4, for a vivid historical review of the research on the 
dopamine system and reinforcement learning. 
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used to illustrate this decision environment is the multi-armed bandit problem (Bush 
and Mosteller, 1955). The decision maker at each time is always offered a fixed 
number of bandits, and, since instances are always the same, the decision can be 
automated by using the stochastic choice formulation given in Equation (19). In a 
special case where	λ = 0, the default turns out to be the one with the highest updated 
strength (most successful experience), or simply, the best one so far. In this special 
case, it is similar to the take-the-best heuristic (Gigerenzer, 2007), a member of one-
good-reason heuristics 7 .  The generalized version, Equation (7), simply adds a 
hierarchical structure to the set of rules by classifying them according to their 
applicability to a certain instance8. Hence, each instance corresponds to a specific set 
of rules with different strengths. The set of rules may be globally the same over 
different instances, but their respective weights (strengths) and hence priorities can 
differ from one instance to another.  In behavioral economics, reinforcement learning 
has been proposed as a model of low rationality (Erev and Roth, 1998; Duffy, 2006; 
Chen, 2013). This original intention may lead people to misperceive it as a mere 
model fitting for very simple behavior in a rather recurrent decision environment9. 
However, as we shall see, this is not entirely the case.  Not only can reinforcement 
learning serve as a model to handle novel situations, but it can also serve as a meta-
level learning model, i.e., to learn how to learn. Vriend (2002) is the best illustration 
to exemplify these two features. Vriend (2002) considers the kind of decisions which 
are unique and hence not repeated (not similar). Examples can be buying a car, buying 
a house, choosing a restaurant in Pinamar, and booking a hotel in Reykjavik. Hence, 
strictly speaking, reinforcement learning cannot be directly applied in these situations, 
since available alternatives (available experiences) are not transferrable (commutable) 
from one place to the other. Nevertheless, with such a series of novel situations, one 
can learn from the experiences of others, the so-called social learning, and there are 
different ways to learn from others (Nowak, 2006; Scott, 2012). Vriend considered 
																																																						
7 By one-good-reason heuristics, agents focus on only one good reason or cue to make 
a decision, rather than considering all cues and weighting them. Contrary to 
expectations, they are not just fast, but also more accurate in a variety of 
environments (Snook et al., 2005; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). 
8 While we use the term hierarchy, Equation (7) is not the hierarchical reinforcement 
learning normally formulated in the context of a Markov decision process (Barto and 
Mahadevan, 2003) and recently applied to computational neuroscience (Botvinick, 
2012). The kind of decision considered by us in this chapter is not Markovian, but is 
the type of reinforcement learning model frequently used by experimental economists. 
The usual hierarchical reinforcement learning models use the idea of subroutines, 
macro procedures, modularity, or the so-called abstraction states to deal with the curse 
of dimensionality. We shall come back to this idea in Section 5.2. 
9 This ideal environment is very similar to the situation depicted by the movie Ground 
Hog Days as briefly  mentioned in Thaler (2000) 
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three types of rules, namely, randomly-behaving rules (throwing a coin), following 
what the majority did (herding), or replicating the good experiences of others.   
 
These three types of rules can always be applicable to any novel situation, as long as 
the decisions made by others and their resultant experiences are available. In fact, 
Vriend (2002) can be read as a contribution to the economy of Web 2.0 and the agent 
based study of Big Data in the following sense. First, as mentioned in Chen, Chie and 
Tai (2015), the essential characteristic of the Web 2.0 economy concerns the user-
initiated and user-supplied content and the on-line customer review is one major form 
of digital content. Second, while on-line customer review reports can help consumers 
acquire more information on the quality of the product, their fast accumulation can 
result in an overload of information for consumers. To understand how consumers 
make use of this digital content, the aforementioned three types of rules seems to be a 
reasonable beginning. The randomized one does not require any cognitive efforts 
from the decision maker. The second one needs only a counting of heads. The last one 
needs to read the reviews and to know users’ experiences; hence, it may be more 
time-consuming. Reinforcement learning can then be applied to these three levels of 
learning: no learning, shallow learning and deep learning. Reinforcement learning can 
then serves as a model of meta learning.   
 
4 Hierarchical Structure of Decisions   
Quite contrary to what is usually taught in economics, many of our decisions or 
choices are not always based on insufficient information, but on overloaded 
information. In behavioral economics, this conundrum is known as the information 
overload hypothesis10. A  typical heuristic to make a decision in such a situation is not 
to look at all information at  once; instead, information will be given a sequential or 
hierarchical structure so that one  needs to get access to more information only when 
the decision cannot be made based on  the “abridged” version. Because of this 
practical need, a tree or a hierarchical structure can play quite a crucial role in 
decision making or choice making.  
  
4.1 Decision Trees   
The decision tree, a canonical model in computational intelligence, can be interpreted 
as a computational behavioral model corresponding to the hierarchical structure of 
decision making.  Suppose that we are interested in knowing how a tennis player 
decides whether to play tennis. We have a sequence of observations of her past 
decisions,  𝐷, 𝐴 = {(𝑑(, 𝑎()}(tQ  
 
[Insert: Figure 2: The decision tree of the play tennis decision] 
																																																						
10 Given that there are other chapters devoted to this subject, for example, Chen, Chie 
and Tai (2015), to avoid redundancy, we shall not elaborate on this hypothesis further. 
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where 𝑑(  is a binary decision variable, either to play 𝑑( = 1 or not to play 𝑑( = 0. 𝑎(	can be  a vector of attributes which may help define an instance; for example, 
outlook, humidity and wind, if he is only concerned with the weather condition.  
  
A decision tree is constructed based on a top-down greedy algorithm, known as the 
ID3 in machine learning (Quinlan, 1986). The key idea is fairly straightforward. First, 
one finds the attribute	𝑎∗ , say, outlook, that best classifies 𝑫( , and then uses this 
attribute as the root of the decision tree. Then the process is repeated for each subtree. 
The main issue in this greedy algorithm concerns the criterion regarding the choice of 
the best classifying attribute. A common solution to this problem is to select the 
attribute with the highest information gain, which is defined as the expected reduction 
in the entropy of the dataset 𝑫( caused by knowing the value of the 
attribute	𝐴∗ {𝑎(∗}(tQ .   
 
An illustration of a decision tree which is built is given in Figure 2. In this illustration, 
among a sequence of information, the tennis player will first look at the outlook, and 
there are three values for the outlook: sunny, overcast and rainy. If the outlook is 
overcast, then the tennis player will simply disregard the unread information and 
decide to play tennis. On the other hand, if it is not overcast, then the information (the 
second attribute) to be further examined depends on whether the outlook is sunny or 
rainy. The second attribute is humidity if the outlook is sunny, and it is wind if 
outlook is rainy. In each of these two branches, the decision can always be made 
without further looking into the remaining information. In other words, although each 
instance is defined by three attributes, at any given time at most two attributes are 
required in order to make a decision.   
 
The decision tree has been considered to be a fast and frugal heuristic in behavioral 
economics (Gigerenzer, 2007). It might, therefore, be worth discussing the connection 
between machine learning and behavioral economics in their respective use of 
decision trees. First of all, the top-down greedy algorithm as introduced by the AI 
community is applicable to the study of the real decision process, for example, in 
using it for analyzing the observations of human subject experiments. In fact, the idea 
of decision trees  has already been used as a model to analyze and understand the 
decision making observed  in human-subject experiments, such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma games (Axelrod,  1984), ultimatum games (Duffy and Engle-Warnick, 
2002), and trust games (Rieskamp  and Gigerenzer, 2002; Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 
2004, 2006). The heuristics studied in these papers, such as the TIT-FOR-TAT, can 
be presented in the form of a decision tree heuristic. However, none of these studies 
has formally applied the top-down greedy  algorithms to build and formulate a 
decision-tree heuristic; therefore, there is room for  applying the decision-tree model 
to discover the decision-tree heuristics followed by human  subjects in experimental 
or real data (Tagiew, 2012; Rosenfeld et al., 2015).   
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Second, while the top-down greedy algorithm can be useful for data mining and rule 
extraction, the algorithm per se may not provide a good description of the process of 
formation of these heuristics from a behavioral viewpoint. For example, humans may 
find the root attribute, “outlook” in Figure 2, based on their intuition, experience or 
preferences.  In the case of the tennis player, putting outlook as the root attribute may 
be entirely due to the player’s enjoyment in playing, but it may also be due to her past 
performance under different weather conditions. Hence, what is needed in behavioral 
economics is a learning (formation) process for the decision-tree heuristics that are 
employed.   
 
4.2 Incremental Reinforcement Learning   
The learning (formation) process includes two parts: first, the list of all relevant 
attributes, and, second, their ranks (positions) in the decision tree. The first issue is 
more complex and involves the discovery process which we shall come to in Section 
5. Once at is determined, the second issue can be answered by reinforcement learning. 
Assume that decision makers begin with the one-reason heuristic and try to find out 
the best attribute, and then make a decision based on that attribute. In our tennis-
player example, the three attributes will compete for the attention of the tennis-player 
at the first stage. After a while, overcast is selected through reinforcement learning as 
the first attribute, and the decision is:   
 
IF ((Outlook=overcast)   
THEN YES (Play Tennis))   
 
As time goes on, the player may then discover that when the outlook is not overcast,  
he could still have fun playing tennis and a competition for the second attribute is  
triggered again through another reinforcement learning cycle, which leads to the 
identification  of humidity and wind as the second attribute under different branches 
of Figure 2, and the newly developed decision tree is:  IF ([(Outlook=overcast)] OR  
[(Outlook=sunny) AND (Humidity=normal)] OR  [(Outlook=rain) AND 
(Wind=weak)])  THEN YES (Play Tennis))   
 
In sum, the above proposal is to replace the original top-down greedy algorithm by 
with incremental reinforcement learning. In this way, a learning (formation) process 
of the decision-tree heuristic is articulated. The essence of the proposed behavioral 
algorithm’s that it is incremental; basically, it decomposes the entire tree formation 
process into many “multi-armed bandit problems” and applies reinforcement learning 
to each of these bandit problems. Hence, as we have learned from Vriend’s model 
(Section 3.3), reinforcement learning can be applied generally to a meta-level of 
learning, and hence is much more powerful than what we thought.   
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In terms of understanding the human decision-making process, decision trees can also 
be compared to the frequently-used multiple regression models, including the probit 
and logit models. First, human decisions may be fitted well by both these approaches, 
but multiple regression only gives a summary of decision making, rather than a 
process of decision making. Hence, when trying to give an account of how a specific 
decision is made, it is easier to communicate using decision trees rather than by using 
multiple regression.  Second, when making a decision, multiple regression essentially 
need decision makers to pay attention simultaneously to multiple attributes, whereas 
decision trees only require them to focus on one attribute at a time. From the 
viewpoint of cognitive loading, decision trees are less demanding than multiple 
regression11.  
 
5 Evolutionary Computation   
 
5.1 Autonomous Agents   
Evolutionary computation plays a critical role in the development of behavioral 
economics, in particular, the contribution to crystallizing the idea of autonomous 
agents, i.e., agents who are able to discover chances or novelties without external 
guidance, in particular, without those “interventions” from modelers themselves. 
Behavioral economics has long criticized the notion of Homo Economicus used in 
mainstream economics, but their proposed alternative, Homo Sapiens, is also 
suffering from operational emptiness.  John Tomer’s recent proposal on the notion of 
smart persons may not be an entirely new idea, but it clearly reveals the fact that the 
boundedly rational agents in behavioral economics have a blurred face (Tomer, 2015). 
The missing ingredient, as Tomer calls it, in our view is exactly a notion of 
autonomous agents. One reason that the autonomous agents have not been well 
incorporated into behavioral economics is the lack of toolkits. It would probably be 
fair to say that the tools available for economists to build chance-discovering and 
novelty-discovering agents12 with a moderate degree of autonomy were rather limited 
before the early 1990s.   
 
In the early 1990s, genetic algorithms were formally introduced to economics as a 
tool to construct autonomous agents (Holland and Miller, 1991). The notion of 
autonomous agents is crucial for behavioral economics since a set of heuristics, be 
they biased or frugal, should not be taken as given, except those which are proved to 
be genetically-driven  and are innate (see also Section 5.3). In general, the employed 
heuristics are constantly evolving and, as time goes on, new heuristics may be 
																																																						
11 This is specific when we consider some cognitive constraint, such as the Millers 
magic number, seven (Miller, 1956). 
12	While chance-discovering is tied to the notion of random behavior, the idea and the 
process of novelty-discovery does not necessarily have to random. Also, see Witt 
(2009).	
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discovered. In a nutshell, heuristics should not be treated as scientific laws; instead, 
they can be best understood as an evolutionary process.   
 
A good illustration of the evolution of heuristics as well as personal traits is the 
integration of gambling psychology in an agent-based lottery market (Chen and Chie, 
2008).  In their model, Chen and Chie (2008) incorporated three characteristics into 
their gambling decision-making model; these three are the halo effects (lottomania) – 
related to participation ratio, conscious selection, and aversion to regret. What 
differentiates their model from the typical behavioral models is that these three 
characteristics are not imposed exogenously, but are probabilistic emergent properties.   
 
A bit string, also known as a chromosome in genetic algorithms, is used to code the 
three  characteristics of agents, and after decoding one can know the state of each 
characteristic, as shown in (20).  
 
   1001……… . .0001																																				S	V(-
s(VVs(VU	s(V 	| 	 100……… . .111																																				Q	V(-
U-V-	-f_f(VU 	| 		 0………… . . . . . .1																																					V(-
>fff		ff(	sf-VU
 
(20) 
 
 The standard single-population genetic algorithm is then applied to evolve a 
population of these randomly-generated bit strings, characterizing the initial 
heterogeneities of gamblers on these characteristics. One can then observe how each 
of these characteristics changes over time, both at the individual level and aggregate 
level. From a market design perspective, Chen and Chie (2008) studied the effect of 
the lottery tax rate on the population size of non-gamblers (agents with a zero lottery 
participation rate). While the expected return of “investing” in a lottery is negative, 
the gamblers will not be driven out by the market selection mechanism defined by 
genetic algorithms. In addition, from probability theory, while conscious selection of 
winning numbers does not make any sense, Chen and Chie, however, showed that a 
rather moderate degree of conscious-selection behavior will remain in the market; 
hence, the market also fails to drive out this “irrational” behavior. Perhaps the most 
intriguing part concerns their analysis of the regret aversion behavior. It was found 
that the attention to other gamblers’ rewards (jackpots), a kind of social preference, 
may co-evolve with their devotion to gambling; both are codetermined by the lottery 
design (the lottery tax rate). Specifically, when the lottery tax rate is high, the size and 
the winning probability of jackpots become low and the gamblers’ devotion also 
decreases, accompanied by their greater pleasure in being released from the possible 
regrets of not gambling. This exemplifies how evolutionary computation can work 
with behavioral economics by making the implicit selection process explicit and by 
providing a test for the stability of these behavioral patterns.  
  
5.2 Hierarchical Modularity   
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If behaviors (routines and heuristics) are not static, but are constantly evolving, then 
one has to ask what the universal representation of the behavior of the evolution of 
behaviors is. In this section, in the spirit of Simon (1962), we propose hierarchical 
modularity as the fundamental representation. Generally speaking, modularity refers 
to the idea of self-encapsulated, independently operationable, and reusable 
(evolvable) routines, procedures or programs. It provides us with a constructive way 
to think about what a decision-making system is, and, in particular, how a decision 
maker can cope with complexity and survive in the constantly evolving environment.   
 
In computational intelligence, the idea of modularity can be realized by genetic 
programming (Koza, 1992). Instead of working on finite-length strings (bits), genetic 
programming directly operates on the space of computation programs which are 
represented using the formal language theory, specifically, the context-free grammar 
(Linz, 2006). Starting with a finite set of alphabets (primitives) and following the 
given grammar (production rules), one can develop phrases, sentences, paragraphs, 
chapters, books, all the way up without a limit. In each stage of this development, 
simpler or lower-level modules are used to construct sophisticated or higher-level 
modules, and this process can continue without an end. To understand the meaning of 
a decision rule, one only needs to harness its immediate constituents (modules). Since 
each module is already encapsulated, there is no need to go further down to their 
modules, and their modules’ modules, and so on. The modular structure, therefore, 
reduces the huge amount of information required in applying a rule or making a 
decision.   
 
5.3 Heterogeneity   
In addition to being a tool for the computational behavioral model of searching and 
discovery, evolutionary computation also contributes to behavioral economics by 
generating agents with heterogeneous traits. There has been a growing attempt in 
recent times to explore the genetic influence that concerns human decision making. 
Some recent areas of focus in behavioral economics, such as self-control, impulsivity, 
addiction, patience, risk preference, and cognitive capacity, are being examined for 
possible heritable factors. The literature on this area continues to grow. In 2007, 
Daniel Benjamin and his colleagues gave this nascent field a neologism: 
genoeconomics (Benjamin et al., 2007).   
 
The relation between cognitive capacity and decision making has become an issue of 
focus in this stream of the literature. Earlier genoeconomic studies have indicated a 
possible pathway from genetic causes to cognitive capacity, to education and to 
income. Recently, the decision-making capability under an uncertain environment has 
also been included as a part of this pathway (Beauchamp et al., 2011; Callaway, 2012; 
MacKillop, 2013; Ashraf and Galor, 2015). In parallel, experimental economists have 
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also begun to design human-subject experiments to examine the possible effects of 
cognitive capacity on economic decisions13.  
 
 If cognitive capacity does affect decision making, including both processes and 
outcomes, then what will be the ideal computational model to take account of this 
factor?  Recently, it has been suggested that the population size, a key parameter used 
in evolutionary computation, can be regarded as a proxy variable for cognitive 
capacity (Casari, 2004; Chen, Tai, and Wang, 2010). In physical terms, population 
size is related to space complexity in computation theory. The logistics of a complex 
product requires many intermediate steps and hence needs a large space to store and 
to integrate intermediate products. If the space is not large enough, a complex product 
may be beyond the affordability of all available logistics. Hence, population size 
directly determines the capability of the parallel processing of many intermediate 
tasks.   
 
On the other hand, the working memory capacity of a human being is frequently 
tested based on the number of the cognitive tasks that humans can simultaneously 
process (Cappelletti, Guth and Ploner, 2008). Dual tasks have been used in hundreds 
of psychological experiments to measure the attentional demands of different mental 
activities (Pashler, 1998). Hence, the population size seems to be an appropriate 
choice with regard to mimicking the working memory capacity of human agents; in 
this sense, evolutionary computation can directly control the ‘cognitive capacity’ of a 
computational behavioral model through varying population size. The heterogeneity 
of cognitive capacity of different human subjects can be represented by a society of 
artificial agents driven by genetic algorithms or genetic programming with different 
population sizes.   
 
The proposed computational behavioral model of cognitive capacity (working 
memory  capacity, WMC) has been applied to agent-based14 double auction markets 
to examine  the effect of WMC on earning performance (Chen, Tai, and Wang, 2010). 
It is found that the artificial traders with larger WMC can earn more than the artificial 
traders with smaller WMC. However, this dominance becomes less (statistically) 
significant when WMC increases further. Moreover, if we allow artificial traders with 
lower WMC more time to learn so that their deficiency in terms of WMC can be 
compensated by the longer time of learning (evolution), the above income gap can 
disappear if the difference in WMC among traders is limited; otherwise, the gap can 
only be narrowed, but it will not disappear.  Therefore, the above simulation shows 
that, even though the double auction market is an easy environment, it can still 
																																																						
13 For a survey of these experiments, the interested reader is referred to Chen (2015), 
Chapter 17 
14	See Wäckerle et.al (2014) for the role of different memory sizes on social trust and 
institutional change analyzed within an agent-based framework.	
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generate persistent income inequality if the heterogeneity in the cognitive capacity of 
traders is significant enough.  
 
6 Collective Behavior   
Our next section focuses on the ant colony optimization algorithm, another 
computational intelligence tool that is frequently used in the context of optimization, 
such as the travelling salesman problem (Dorigo and Stützle, 2010). Compared to 
some other CI tools, such as reinforcement learning and evolutionary computation, 
the ant algorithm or, more generally, swarm intelligence is relatively less familiar to 
behavioral economists.  Due to the important contributions by Alan Kirman (Kirman, 
1991, 1993), economists have a chance to access interesting findings and puzzles 
related to ants’ foraging behavior.   
 
Earlier entomological experiments, cited in Kirman (1993), have shown that ants’ 
foraging behavior over two identical equidistant food sources can demonstrate 
constant asymmetric distribution over the two sources; say, one source attracts the 
majority of ants and the other source attracts the minority of ants. Furthermore, as 
time goes on, the majority side and the minority side will switch without any external 
environmental changes. In other words, ants can collectively generate an endogenous 
fluctuation of their foraging distribution over the two sources of food. While this is an 
entomological finding, it has some significant implications for economics and the 
social sciences. Its possible implications have been well surveyed in Kirman (1993), 
including providing support for a fundamental instability in financial markets.  
 
The underlying mechanism for this endogenous switching is known as a 
communication mechanism called stigmergy. The communication among ants is not 
necessarily direct, but more indirect, partially due to their poor visibility. The ants’ 
reliance on indirect communication has been noticed by the French biologist Pierre-
Paul Grasse (1895- 1985), and he termed this style of communication or interaction 
stigmergy (Grosan and Abraham, 2006). He defined stigmergy as: “Stimulation of 
workers by the performance they have achieved.” Stigmergy is a method of 
communication in which the individuals communicate with each other via modifying 
their local environment. For ants, this is achieved by the release of pheromone along 
their foraging trails.  
 
However, the essence of these algorithms is to have an explicit modeling of social 
interactions on individual behavior. These algorithms are again built on empirical 
grounds, in this case, entomological experiments. Due to the nature of entomology, 
one would hardly argue whether these ants or locusts or other low-level swarms are 
consciously choosing to do anything “rational”; studies of their behavior tend to be 
more in the biological or neurological direction (Garnier, Gautrais and Theraulaz, 
2007; Beekman, Sword and Simpson, 2010). Hence, the experimental results obtained 
here seem to put more focus on the effect of social interactions on emission or release 
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of chemical materials, such as pheromone in the case of ants, or neurotransmitters, 
such as serotonin in the case of locusts (Paula et al., 2015).   
 
We have known that social interactions have many channels to affect agents’ decision 
and behavioral rules, such as social norms, social conformity, homophily, etc. In 
Kirman’s ant model, the proposed social interaction mechanism is binary so that only 
a simple stochastic process, an urn process, is introduced to determine how one 
agent’s decision can be affected by a randomly encountered agent. In computational 
intelligence, the behavioral algorithm is more explicitly related to the accumulated 
pheromone or accumulated serotonin, hence even though the decision can still be 
random, it is stochastic in a way related to various characteristics of social 
interactions, such as the degree of social polarization and the size of social network 
(for the concern of social conformity) (Valentini and Hamann, 2015). This type of 
algorithm essentially allows us to address the connection between social interactions 
and individual decisions through the biological and neural mechanisms. In this regard, 
the development of swarm intelligence stands in a unique position in computational 
behavioral economics in the sense that it can effectively incorporate the findings of 
neuroscientific experiments with these insects into the behavioral algorithms proposed 
for these swarms. Since entomological experiments are easier to implement, we hope 
that the behavioral economists can gain some useful insights, which are more difficult 
to glean get from human fMRI experiments.  
 
7 Can Randomization Be a Heuristic?   
 
All the heuristics reviewed up to this point correspond to some degree of learning 
from either one’s own or others’ experiences and reasoning with them. There is, 
however, a heuristic which requires no memory, no learning, and, absolutely, no 
reasoning. This is known as the zero-intelligence heuristic, to which we now turn.  
 
The zero-intelligence (ZI) agent has been one of the widely employed 
characterizations of an agent in agent-based models and it has had a remarkable 
impact in both economics and finance (Ladley, 2012). The supposed simplicity of this 
kind of agent stems from their lack of strategy and they behave at random. Gode and 
Sunder (1993), and many since then, have employed this device to illustrate the 
irrelevance of a high level of sophistication in strategies and learning at the individual 
level in achieving market level efficiency. ZI agents or randomly behaving agents 
have been employed in wider contexts that range beyond a mere device to separate the 
effect of strategies from that of the market mechanism15.  
 
 The rationale for this agent design is that the individual level details become worn 
out in the aggregate with a large number of heterogeneous agents. Another reason 
																																																						
15 For a critical discussion on the cognitive ability of the ZI agents, see Tubaro (2009) 
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advanced is the lack of precise knowledge about strategies used by different agents, at 
any given point in time. Hence, modeling them as if they behave in a random fashion 
(from a bounded set of strategies) allows one to not commit to one strategy a priori. 
Consequently, “zero intelligence agent” may be a misnomer and entropy maximizing 
agents can serve as a better term. This is because the relationship between zero 
intelligence, cognitive ability and the ease or the simplicity of random behavior may 
not be as obvious or straightforward16.   
 
While there may be a case to start with entropy maximizing agents in the face of 
ignorance, their behavioral underpinnings ought to be scrutinized. The entropy 
maximizing role needs to be distinguished from random behavior as being a proxy for 
simplicity or naivety in terms of strategies (or a lack of them). By relating “zero 
intelligence” to random behavior, the implicit assumption is that random behavior is 
simple to execute and that it requires very little sophistication. To design artificial 
economic agents more like human agents, we need to examine whether the 
programmed actions have a psychological or behavioral foundation. Hence, the 
plausibility of human beings to be able to ‘behave’ in an analogous fashion and the 
associated cognitive demands need to be studied.  In this context, it is therefore 
natural to question the ability and the extent to which human agents can choose 
strategies randomly. More generally, we need to examine whether it is behaviorally 
plausible for an agent to act randomly and for the others to perceive such an action to 
be random.  
 
Studies from psychology indicate that the human ability to perceive randomness and 
act randomly may be limited (Wagenaar, 1972). This problem can be subdivided into 
the ability to perceive, discriminate and generate random behavior, each of which is 
far from easy. In the light of limited memory, cognitive limitation (Hahn and Warren, 
2009) and finiteness of data, detection and execution of random or patternless 
behavior seems notoriously hard (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). This is further 
complicated by difficulties in the characterization of randomness when the data are 
finite. Even a supposedly elementary task of generating random sequences has been 
found to be a non-trivial, difficult exercise for human subjects in experimental 
environments17. In addition, the distinction between the perception and identifiability 
of randomness raises further questions about the indiscriminate use of randomly 
behaving agents in strategic and interactive environments that one often encounters in 
economics and agent-basedmodels (Zhao, Hahn, and Osherson, 2014). If randomness 
is interpreted as a lack of a pattern or rule in the sequence of responses generated, 
then such random behavior requires avoiding any discernible pattern. Interpreted this 
																																																						
16 See Chen (2012) for a discussion on the relationships. 
17 There are studies which argue that random behavior can be learned in the presence 
of feedback (Neuringer, 1986). However, in the standard version of ZI, agents do not 
learn. 
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way, random behavior may require far more intelligence, cognitive ability and 
sophistication than otherwise assumed.  
 
In sum, although randomization in the form of entropy maximization may be often 
considered as a cognitively effortless heuristic, our review indicates that this 
‘stereotype’ may not be entirely correct; hence, without relying on an external device, 
such as a coin, dice, or an oracle, making a truly random decision may not be that 
easy for the human brain. 
 
8 Concluding Remarks   
 
Computational intelligence or machine learning has been developed independently of 
behavioral economics over a period of about three decades. Before this and even 
through this period, the dominating approach regarding decision making in economics 
has been probability and statistics, upon which the rational expectations revolution 
has been built. The formulation of decision making in the mainstream economics 
literature is basically the application of statistical decision theory, which, in turn, is 
the application of von-Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility maximization 
(EUM) framework (Ferguson, 2014). Computational intelligence is a credible 
alternative to this paradigm. Instead of a model driven approach, it is mainly a data-
driven or an experience-based approach. Instead of being restricted to a ‘small world’ 
(Savage, 1972), it mainly deals with uncertainty in a ‘large world’ in which a proper 
probabilistic formulation of the world is often infeasible.   
 
Without being armed with the heavy orthodox machinery, computational intelligence 
relies on various heuristics to build another set of guidelines to learn from the past, to 
cope with complexity, and to make a decision. Some of these heuristics that are 
reviewed in this chapter include similarity, closeness, smoothness, reinforcement, 
default, automation, hierarchy, and modularity. These heuristics together help shape 
what is known as behavioral artificial intelligence (AI), to be distinguished from 
classical AI or symbolic AI (Wooldridge, 2009)18. We believe that computational 
intelligence can consolidate and enrich the study of behavioral economics by 
providing the computational underpinnings of decision-making processes. This 
direction, referred to as computational behavioral economics, will also enhance the 
																																																						
18 About behavioral AI, Wooldridge (2009) made the following remarks:  
The workers in this area were not united by any common approaches, 
but certain themes did occur in this work. Recurring themes were the 
rejection of architectures based on symbolic representations, an 
emphasis on a closer coupling between the agent’s environment and the 
action it performs, and the idea that intelligent behavior can be seen to 
emerge from the interaction of a number of much simpler behaviors. 
(Ibid, p. 395; Italics added.)	
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interdisciplinary conversations between behavioral economics and other related 
disciplines.   
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